tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2935524795017491645.post6588958689068540645..comments2023-11-02T00:51:25.494-07:00Comments on Shattered World : A Worse World War: Bobbyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08707410788628607465noreply@blogger.comBlogger204125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2935524795017491645.post-39498411860111830592008-02-21T06:51:00.000-08:002008-02-21T06:51:00.000-08:00Olefin hereWill see if I can sign in there so we c...Olefin here<BR/><BR/>Will see if I can sign in there so we can continue the conversation there. <BR/><BR/>One last thing CJ - considering the US buildup of carriers in the ATL you basically have to look at the Japanese buildup figures from OTL and start over again from scratch for their war plan to make any sense. If the US really did have the amount of fleet carriers that Bobby has said they have then the Japanese had to have more than eight fleet carriers available in 1946 – it is the only way their war plan makes any sense. Especially since they would have known that, at most, four carriers would be at Pearl at any one time. That means even if they took out all four they are still seriously outnumbered by the US in total carriers - even if the canal is shut down it only takes a relatively short time to get modern ships around to the Pacific the hard way. <BR/><BR/>However a CV fleet of eight in commission and another four ready to join now makes the odds at least even – and when you throw in the CVL’s actually gives them an advantage. Now their war plan makes sense – especially if they have several Taiho’s in commission taking on older smaller carriers with half the Essex force out of commission from day one.<BR/><BR/>Japan would have gone for, at minimum parity with the US by the time of the war start in CV’s or parity with the strike at Pearl figured in. Anything else is completely suicidal – and Japan would not have embarked on a war that was suicide from day one. They had to have a hope of victory – and that means a greatly increased carrier fleet and a changed carrier build plan – including, as I stated, doing many of the 1942-43 conversions pre-war (Chitose, Chiyuda, Niishin, Hiyo) to get those decks ready from day one – most likely done started once the decision for war was made in late 1945 after their oil supplies from Germany were cut off once the AfD didn’t collapse quickly under the German attack.<BR/><BR/>And don’t tell me they figured Hitler would declare war – Yamamoto would have never come up with a plan for victory that counted on German intervention to keep the US carrier fleet in the Atlantic pinned in place. Any plan like that would have been shot down from day one by the Emperor and by the Japanese military. <BR/><BR/>Oh and before anyone says well where did they get the steel and oil to build all those ships – well where did the Germans get the steel to build a huge tank force, the Reich class BB’s, hundreds of subs, the battlecruisers, etc.. that were ready in 1945? The answer – the Axis forces must have done in ATL what they didn’t do in OTL – which was maximize industrial input and planning a lot earlier and thus be able to get stuff built a lot faster than they did in OTL. And considering the vastly greater resources they had interwar from 1942 – 46 (or 45 for Germany) to use it would have been possible. <BR/><BR/>(i.e. give Japan an extra four years to build ships with the iron ore, nickel, oil, coal, etc.. they had in China and Korea and the supplies captured in the Soviet Union with their decision to not build a modern tank army and I think 12 full size CV in commission or working up at the time of Pearl is very possible)Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2935524795017491645.post-72243582106783818872008-02-21T03:54:00.000-08:002008-02-21T03:54:00.000-08:00Hey Guys Lets move this to the Old Discussion Boar...Hey Guys Lets move this to the Old Discussion Board it will be alot easier to read.... :)Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2935524795017491645.post-12640218549424423842008-02-19T15:05:00.000-08:002008-02-19T15:05:00.000-08:00Olefin hereRemember guys - Bobby specifically has ...Olefin here<BR/><BR/>Remember guys - Bobby specifically has said in the past that he didnt document every carrier, BB,etc.. loss in the war - just the ones lost in big battles. Thus even though the total loss count is 15 lost in fleet battles that doesnt mean that is all the losses they took.<BR/><BR/>So any CV's lost that are not part of major battles - losses by the way on both sides - were most likely not mentioned by Bobby. <BR/><BR/>And since OTL is ripe with such losses (lets start with Wasp, Ark Royal, Shinano just to name three such obvious losses let alone a bunch of Japanese, US, and British CVE's lost to submarines) and it is very obvious that the Japanese fleet is a lot bigger than OTL.<BR/><BR/>Plus remember we are talking about the 1946 and 47 battles here - which correspond to the 1942 carrier battles for timing - you didnt see too many CVL being used there except as decoys or convoy escorts. The only times CVL were pressed into service with fleets were Hosho at Midway (since the BB were slow enough it could keep up) or in the Solomons as decoys or convoy escorts.<BR/><BR/>Now by 1944 they had no choice. And even at the Marianas they had very close to full deckloads - for the last time mind you.<BR/><BR/>So what you are seeing here most likely is that the 8 CV force at Pearl was probably the first line force, with another 2 - 4 CV still fitting out at home or in training and thus not at Pearl. The CVL that were in operation most likely had second line pilots.<BR/><BR/>After the losses in the early carrier battles those second line guys went to the remaining CV - and the CVL's got trainees and lesser and lesser deckloads<BR/><BR/>With the result that by the time a lot of those CVL's and perhaps even CVE's had to go into fleet battles they definitely were not ready for prime time.<BR/><BR/>All comes down to what Bobby calls a CV - and I would like to see him weigh in on this. I know that normally he keeps out of the fray on details - but it would really help define the Pacific battles and give some real definition to what the Japanese fleet of 1946-47 really was.<BR/><BR/>The German fleet of 1945 for instance seems to be much bigger than what even I would think was realistic given the constraints of the time they had to build it up after the Eurasian War. <BR/><BR/>And perhaps the Japanese did something as simple as greatly expand their pilot training and rotation compared to what they did in OTL - which could be the solution to how did they get enough pilots for all the carriers they seem to have deployed.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2935524795017491645.post-74521643001417844592008-02-18T20:34:00.000-08:002008-02-18T20:34:00.000-08:00Define "a lot more". They built ten full sized CV ...Define "a lot more". They built ten full sized CV in OTL, eleven really if you count the 'Shinano' conversion. <BR/><BR/>I think the basic problem in this discussion isn't total numbers built; it's when they were actually available for combat with a worked-up air group. There would have been recently completed ships still working up early in the war and new ships coming online on the war dragged on. It’s not a pure raw numbers game. If it were, then there is no way that the ‘Vaterland’ group would have ever made it back to Germany, the AfD Eastern Fleet would have made it into the Java Sea let alone out of it, or the Regia Marina would have done as well as it has. The fact is that sometimes ships are just not available for whatever reason or they are someplace else. You can play the same game with Japanese battleships. They would have had five ‘Yamato’ class ships available at the time of Java Sea. Going off that alone, the battle never should have been the tactical draw that it was. <BR/><BR/>It’s also important to understand how Japanese air groups worked. Japanese naval squadrons were not interchangeable in the same way that USN squadrons were. Their air groups were a complete unit, and a fairly inflexible one at that. When the Kido Butai sailed for Midway in OTL, they did so with understrength air groups – even though they had the largely intact air groups from ‘Shokaku’ and ‘Zuikaku’ available. The problem was that the air group was tied to the individual carrier. This inflexibility did not change until later in the war. By contrast, USN air groups interchanged squadrons with little difficulty. So factor in air groups that got chewed up and needed time to rebuild, and you see that an available hull does not necessarily equal a deployable warship. <BR/><BR/>Oh, for what it’s worth, the losses of fifteen IJN carriers are specifically mentioned in the story up through the Death Ride. <BR/><BR/>Moving on. <BR/><BR/>Now just because someplace in the Pacific was the subject of a Japanese air raid doesn't mean that the raid had to come from a carrier. If you look at the ranges of the aircraft that would have been in IJN & IJAAF service in 1946, they are fully capable of striking targets in Malaya, the Philippines, and the Netherlands East Indies on D+1 from bases in occupied China and Formosa. It only gets better from there as they acquire new bases. It's not as though the Japanese were incapable of conducting combat operations without the benefit of carrier air power. <BR/><BR/>The problem here is that you can't guesstimate what they had in ATL unless you have an understanding of what they actually planned pre-war in OTL. You can't just grant the IJN a certain number of carriers just because it sounds cool or you like what some website says. It is necessary to look at the IJN's actual building plans which were based on actual industrial ability and perceived strategic needs, and knowledge of the USN’s 1940 Program. <BR/>* There was ONE carrier in the Fourth plan (1939-45) - 'Taiho'<BR/>* There were TWO improved 'Taihos' in the original Fifth plan (1941-47) [one source says three]<BR/>* When Japan decided to go to war with the western powers, there was ONE carrier in their Emergency Program - 'Unryu'. This plan replaced the Fifth plan and its ‘Taihos’. <BR/><BR/>Now, since we know that the USN built additional carriers in the late 1930s, I’ll be generous and say that a second ‘Taiho’ was authorized as part of the Fourth plan. That gives the Kido Butai eight worked up carriers to hit Pearl Harbor with in mid-1946. Now it’s hard to know how the Eurasian War would have affected the Fifth plan, but it’s likely that it was pushed back some due to competing resources. Let’s be generous and say that they went with the three carrier plan with a construction time of about three years per ship and assume lay downs in 1943 and 1944, say one in 1943 and two in 1944. That puts one ship in the water sometime in 1946 and working up, with two more in 1947. <BR/><BR/>Now, the Sixth Replenishment plan was likely stillborn. Though there were likely a few CVL & CVE conversions between 1943-45. So when the Japanese decided on war with the United States and the AfD, likely Spring 1946, they would have embarked on a Wartime Urgent Replenishment program. It would be here that a mass production design like the ‘Unryu’ would show up. <BR/><BR/>But not so fast on a surge of carrier construction. Bear in mind that the Japanese tended to not plan for long wars. They counted on a short victorious war where the IJN performed superbly and their enemies didn’t. So figure maybe 1-2 ‘Unryus’ are ordered in anticipation of losses and show up in 1948. Figure they don’t have their freak out until May 1947 after the losses at Midway are added to those from Santa Cruz and Java Sea. In response, they order a large number of carriers, mostly ‘Unryus’. A few of them show up just in time for the Death Ride. <BR/><BR/>Also relevant is the specific mention of just how many carriers the IJN brought with it to particular fights.<BR/>* Pearl Harbor: 8<BR/>* Midway: 5<BR/>* Slot: 2<BR/>* Wake: 3<BR/>* South China Sea: 4<BR/>* Death Ride: 4<BR/><BR/>Using fifteen as a starting point, assuming mentioned losses are full size carriers, accounting for what I said above, and factoring in losses and new construction, the IJN likely never had more than nine full size carriers in service at their peak strength in late 1946/early 1947. Things start going downhill after Santa Cruz and Java Sea – post-Midway, new construction doesn’t keep pace with losses. So you might get to your magic number early in the war by counting CVLs, but the ones with any real speed had air groups equal to many US CVE classes. Whatever CVLs were around would have spent most of their time sitting in Hashirajima with the First Fleet or running around on secondary operations based in actual OTL employment. Figure that over the course of the war, a number of CVLs and CVEs were lost to various causes. <BR/><BR/>Oh, the IJN actually did bring AVs (seaplane tenders/carriers) along on fights - the ‘Chiyoda’ and ‘Nisshin’ were with the main body at OTL Midway carrying midget submarines. The CVLs tended to go as well – they covered the battleline so the big carriers could be used offensively. <BR/><BR/><B>Historic Note</B><BR/>Those five improved 'Taihos' and 15 'Unryus' from OTL that folks like to go on about only came about after the disaster at Midway and after Japan abandoned battleship production. In ATL, they continued building battleships through 1947 - completing three additional 'Yamatos' and two 'Super-Yamatos' as battleships, plus two battlecruisers. <BR/>For anyone curious about the projected completion dates for the post-Midway carriers:<BR/>1944 – ‘Shinano’, ‘Ibuki’, ‘Taiho’, 2 ‘Unryu’<BR/>1945: 5 ‘Unryu’<BR/>1946: 4 ‘Unryu’, 1 ‘Taiho’<BR/>1947: 2 ‘Unryu’, 2 ‘Taiho’<BR/>1948: 2 ‘Taiho’<BR/><BR/>**********************************<BR/>**********************************<BR/>Heard back from Bobby. Those three extra USN carriers were not CVEs. They were built to the OTL ‘Wasp’ design that was really a cheaper, scaled-down ‘Yorktown’.<BR/><BR/>He also confirmed that other PACFLT carriers not with the ‘Wasp’ group were doing other things across the Pacific. He also mentioned that the timeline is “high level” and he doesn’t mention every little battle.CJhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04227819071706739787noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2935524795017491645.post-56093753950962945052008-02-18T20:27:00.000-08:002008-02-18T20:27:00.000-08:00Olefin, we've got 15 specified losses of Japanese ...Olefin, we've got 15 specified losses of Japanese aircraft carriers over the course of the entire war. Presumably they were all big enough to warrant a mention. Given a realistic calculation of how many fleet carriers they would have available at various points during the war, the CVLs had to be in the thick of the fighting. And yes, that includes ones that may not meet your criterion for ones that have any business in a fleet engagement.<BR/><BR/>Having a deck does not mean they have enough trained pilots to fill them. At Cape Egano, Ozawa only had 116 aircraft for four carriers that had a capability to carry 174. Historically at the time of Midway, the CVL air groups were very understrength. It's also worth mentioning that what really chewed up the IJN's carrier aviators in OTL was committing them to the Solomons from land bases. By the time decks were available again, the air groups were a shadow of their former selves.CJhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04227819071706739787noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2935524795017491645.post-50598183103903178912008-02-18T17:15:00.000-08:002008-02-18T17:15:00.000-08:00olefin heresorry CT - but its not my words its Bob...olefin here<BR/><BR/>sorry CT - but its not my words its Bobby's - i.e. the three carriers at Wake Island represented half the remaining strength of the Japanese carriers in the Central Pacific - note it doesnt say the Pacific or their entire fleet - its says Central Pacific - so that means at least 13 fleet carriers plus that were fast enough to be fleet carriers - i.e. not the Ryuho, Hosho, or the army CVE tubs - to have the numbers mentioned in his story up to Wake Island. <BR/><BR/>And they still had other carriers - meaning somehow they got enough pilots to man all those carriers.<BR/> <BR/>Now conceivably some could be recent conversions or new construction - but considering how long it took Japan in OTL to do conversions and new carriers I dont see them adding many in the first year and a half of the war <BR/><BR/>so could we say that they added 3-4conversions and new construction in that time - possibly - but that would be at most.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2935524795017491645.post-20649675239456614342008-02-17T20:41:00.000-08:002008-02-17T20:41:00.000-08:00CJ - Sorry - Got the stuff and replied just I have...CJ - Sorry - Got the stuff and replied just I have been away from Email since Friday spending all my hard earned cash on a new Vehicle.<BR/><BR/>I will miss not having car payments I was just getting used to being independently wealthy.<BR/><BR/>Or as Daffy Said " Im rich im wealth Im a greedy little miser...."Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2935524795017491645.post-10884192176149410612008-02-16T08:10:00.000-08:002008-02-16T08:10:00.000-08:00Hey Charles, are you still at the same email addre...Hey Charles, are you still at the same email address? I tried to send you some stuff but I never heard back.CJhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04227819071706739787noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2935524795017491645.post-46007627762494081652008-02-15T20:49:00.000-08:002008-02-15T20:49:00.000-08:00*ROTFL*I think Oelfin that I am not the one in nee...*ROTFL*<BR/><BR/>I think Oelfin that I am not the one in need of a Break.<BR/><BR/>The Japanese moved there carriers about as needed. First to attack Hawaii then to the South Pacific and then back to the Central Pacific. It is only your oppinion that the Japanese had 6 Carriers in the Central Pacific and a bunch somewhere else. If they had any more they might have used them but maybe those other Carriers were not full Fleet Carriers and maybe any other Fleet Carriers were simply Damaged or still under contstruction.<BR/><BR/>Anyway the numbers you have stated as CJ put it are very high and very likely to have snapped the Japanese ability to Logistically train flight crews to operate from them.<BR/><BR/>As it is All Fleet Carriers are not the same.... take the Essex Block II & Block III Carriers and say the Shinano Converted Battle Ship or many of the other Japanese sort of Carrier Conversions.<BR/><BR/>The Japanese might very well have produced 13 Fleet Carriers but Im pretty sure they didnt have them all in service at the same time. I am also pretty sure some of those Fleet Carriers had to be fast CVL just like the US Cruiser Conversions.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2935524795017491645.post-29758237284653218712008-02-15T13:28:00.000-08:002008-02-15T13:28:00.000-08:00Olefin hereThese are clearly fleet carriers we are...Olefin here<BR/><BR/>These are clearly fleet carriers we are talking about CT – you aren’t going to take CVE tubs or training carriers into battles against Essex carriers. Why not just blow them up in the harbor and save the Americans the trouble? These are clearly fleet carriers we are talking about - which means either CV’s or CVL’s that can keep up with the fleet – i.e. meaning not Hiyo or Ryuho. The Japanese did use light carriers in fleet battles in OTL – but they were either desperate (Leyte, Philippines Sea) or they were covering invasion forces (Coral Sea) or they were decoys. They definitely weren’t part of the fleet fights in the early years where they were integral parts of the fleet carrier groups – which is what we are talking about in the actions from Pearl up to Wake Island.<BR/><BR/>And the Japanese never called seaplane tenders carriers – they called them seaplane tenders or auxiliary carriers – and they weren’t stupid enough to take them into fleet battles.<BR/><BR/>So counting hulls is right here – they very obviously had at least 13+ fleet carriers (since as Bobby said they were only six carriers in the Central Pacific, not six carriers in the whole Japanese fleet) that saw action between Pearl and Wake Island. That means they were either full size CV or they were CVL that could actually keep up in a fleet battle – not tubby CVE’s or old training carriers operating 8 planes.<BR/><BR/>So give it a break – either Bobby has to change his timeline numbers a bunch – or the Japanese obviously built a lot more fleet carriers in ShatteredWorld than they ever did in OTL.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2935524795017491645.post-13803939456188775702008-02-15T04:09:00.000-08:002008-02-15T04:09:00.000-08:00*Chuckles*Ok Oelfin Carriers in the Body and fende...*Chuckles*<BR/><BR/>Ok Oelfin Carriers in the Body and fender shop do count towards the total of Fleet Carriers in exhistance.<BR/><BR/>I havent gone back and reread all the early Japanese raids in the South Pacific around Singapore, PI, and Dutch East Indies but historically a huge amount of this action was carried out by Japanese Land Based Aircraft not Carrier Based Aircraft.<BR/><BR/>Also the Japanese counted things a Carriers that the United States did not even consider Carriers but as tenders. The Japanese Float plane tenders were classified as Carriers not Aircraft Ferries or tenders like the US AVG that latter became CVE's of which the US Built over 100.<BR/><BR/>Basically you are reading the Japanese Carriers lost as all being Fleet Carriers and if you look at the Battles of Coral Sea you will see in OTL as an example the US sank 1 Light Carrier and Damaged one Fleet Carrier.<BR/><BR/>You have to remember that Bobby Counts Cruisers at least the Large Heavy Cruisers as Capital Ships.????<BR/><BR/>Anyway I think our numbers are all off all over the place. Basically we have a range of the numbers of Japanese Carriers CJ and I are at the low end realizing what it take to build and support a full CV and you Oelfin are at the high end just counting hulls.<BR/><BR/>Besides you keep forgetting the Imperial Japanese Army's Carriers as well.... :)Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2935524795017491645.post-54192915388245828162008-02-13T15:05:00.000-08:002008-02-13T15:05:00.000-08:00Olefin hereLets look at numbers and lossesThe Japa...Olefin here<BR/><BR/>Lets look at numbers and losses<BR/><BR/>The Japanese have 8 fleet carriers to hit Pearl with at the beginning of the war plus others that were obviously hitting Malaya, the Philliphines, etc..<BR/><BR/>Between then and August 15, 1947 they lose on carrier on Feb 12, one carrier on April 8. As of May 18 it is said they only have 5 carriers remaining in the Central Pacific - and then they lose two of them on May 18 and have another heavily damaged.<BR/><BR/>They lose 2 more in the big battle later that year in the Solomons.<BR/><BR/>Now if we add that up that is a total loss of 6 carriers and one heavily damaged by late in 1947.<BR/><BR/>However on Jan 16, 1948 they suddenly have six carriers still in the Central Pacific (i.e. the three carriers at Wake represent half the carriers left in the Central Pacific)<BR/><BR/>So lets add - 6 carriers lost, one in the body shop and six carriers in the Central Pacific alone - meaning over 13 carriers right there, 13 carriers big enough to fight in fleet battles - and there are others still around since Bobby didnt say the last six carriers in the Japanese fleet, he said six carriers in the Central Pacific.<BR/><BR/>Thus they had to have at least 13 Fleet carriers plus other fleet carriers in other areas of the Pacific plus CVL's that are too slow for fleet ops plus the CVE's to have the numbers Bobby has shown to have existed in his story.<BR/><BR/>So dont tell me I am reading something into the story that isnt there - either Bobby needs to seriously rewrite the Pacific or the Japanese had a lot more carriers than either you or CT are willing to admit to.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2935524795017491645.post-8772726564782885282008-02-13T11:21:00.000-08:002008-02-13T11:21:00.000-08:00When the Kido Butai hit Pearl Harbor they did so w...When the Kido Butai hit Pearl Harbor they did so with eight carriers. So sending three of them to work with the CVLs around the Philippines and in the South China Sea does not imply a huge number of carriers. Keep in mind that the only real opposition outside of the Central Pacific was an AfD fleet bottled up in Singapore. I'll say it again - if the IJN really had the numbers available that you are suggesting then the AfD Eastern Fleet never would have made it into the Java Sea, let alone out of it. <BR/><BR/>You are reading something into the story that just isn't there.CJhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04227819071706739787noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2935524795017491645.post-22391949292795562202008-02-13T06:02:00.000-08:002008-02-13T06:02:00.000-08:00Olefin hereSakhalin was bigger than you are statin...Olefin here<BR/><BR/>Sakhalin was bigger than you are stating CT - I have posted before how much it was producing and it could easily have provided at least enough oil to keep Japanese military operations in China and Russia going pre-war as well as training ops for the navy. However its not big enough to keep Japan growing, nor it is big enough pre-war for what they needed for industry and for its military.<BR/><BR/>Japan was in a better position as to oil and minerals in ShatteredWorld than it was in OTL. However in the end they still needed more – Sakhalin and Russia and China and Manchuria gave them what they needed to build their fleet and military – but it had to push them to the breaking point to do it. So in the end why attack – well for one because the AfD was weak in Asia after the first year of WWII. For another if Japan was going to continue to grow economically and militarily they had to have new resources. Plus there is one other big factor – Japan was basically at close to its maximum strength that they could be with their available resources – and the US was very soon going to get an infusion of new BB, CV and other new ships. <BR/><BR/>So Japan basically had two choices – hit the US and AfD in that moment – before the AfD could shift resources to Asia and before the US got the new Essex carriers, BB’s, etc – or basically see their military buildup go to naught. I also think they thought that Hitler would come to their aid – which he didn’t. They miscalculated and thought that Hitler would pay them back for Japan stabbing the USSR in the back and basically drawing a lot of strength away during the Eurasian War. And instead Hitler did the smart thing, stayed out – and Japan took the full fury of the US.<BR/><BR/>Oh speaking of oil and Germany – keep in mind that the Chechnyan revolt took the Soviets by surprise so the Grozny field may have fallen intact into Axis hands – that oil field was second only to Baku and much bigger than Ploesti. <BR/><BR/>If the Germans and Chechnyans took it intact – and they may very well have done that – then the whole calculation of what oil is available for shipping to Japan from 1942-1945 has to be changed.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2935524795017491645.post-67799818327876994672008-02-13T03:15:00.000-08:002008-02-13T03:15:00.000-08:00Actually I am not forgetting Sakhalins Oil. What...Actually I am not forgetting Sakhalins Oil. What I dont want to do is overstate the difficulty in drilling for it and how little of the Oil field was developed when they took it from the Russians.<BR/><BR/>Basically unless Sakhalin comes completely intact with drilling rigs and a refinery it is of limited value to Japan in 1941-43 at a minimum. Now with it being their only remaining supply of Oil its critical.<BR/><BR/>I think the easiest for Germany and the most expensive for Japan way to fix Japans problem is Synthetic Oil. If IG Farbin I believe actually shares all the technical data it was told to with the Japanese and then the Japanese invest a huge amount of resources they can build a couple of full sized Synthetic Fuel plants. The problems is the Japanese will have to be completely pragmatic. They will have to cancel the Army and Navy competitive R&D Projects into Synthetic Fuels, they will have to ask IG Farbin the right questions and get the right answers and then they will have to invest heavily in Heavy Machinery they probably cant build themselves. This will actually take resource away from the army and the navy in the short term like 1941-42 significantly lower budgets. This is on the basis of the size of Japan economy a really seriously huge investment.<BR/><BR/>Investing in building a refinery would be nearly as large as an investment as Japan only had 1 refinery complex. Basically spend money to build a large Chemical Industry dedicated to turning coal dust into Synthetic Fuels. Or dedicate lots of resource into Expanding drilling and production on Sakhalin and the ability to refine the oil once it reaches Japan.<BR/><BR/>On the other hand if Japan had sufficent Oil to run their economy and their Military and sufficent Iron Ore & Coal to be able to trade it for more Oil as necessary then exactly why did Japan attack the United States as it would appear the US Oil Embargo would have been failing. And the Japanese Navy while stronger is not significantly stronger in comparison to the USN. Basically the US is corespondingly stronger then historical and has completed a huge number of new carriers and battle ships and cruisers. The USAAC is really large so Why did the Japanese who reluctantly went to war with the US in the first place go to war with the US...???????Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2935524795017491645.post-7189597845256689712008-02-12T21:24:00.000-08:002008-02-12T21:24:00.000-08:00Olefin hereAgain you keep forgetting Sakhalin's oi...Olefin here<BR/><BR/>Again you keep forgetting Sakhalin's oil - which the Japanese had seized in its entirety during the Eurasian War - that is a lot of oil, and it is extremely easy to ship it to Japan - that alone could explain how Japan kept going until 1946, when combined with the oil from the SAFB and other sources - and there are refineries in the SAFB that could have refined the product and sold it to Japan - <BR/><BR/>and again how could Japan have paid the SAFB - with iron ore, coal and above all military equipment that the SAFB needed - which could even have been stuff they captured from the Soviets.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2935524795017491645.post-36951921181795978372008-02-12T20:48:00.000-08:002008-02-12T20:48:00.000-08:00I agree on totaly on the need for tankers and see ...I agree on totaly on the need for tankers and see no reason for the US to build lend lease tankers for the Italians and the Germans. US flagged tankers would have and could have easily delivered the Oil and Gasoline directly to the docks in Hamburg or other costal German cities.<BR/><BR/>As for SAFB oil... who is refining it for the Japanese. And more importantly with the SAFB expanding their economy leaps and bounds why are they not using this oil themsleves. Basically the entire SAFB has less oil then Venesuela and the Japanese economy especially a drastically enlarged ship building and pilot training program is going to need significanly more oil then historical.<BR/><BR/>Basically in 1941 with the start of the US Oil Embargo the Japanese economy started to starve and they had to ration oil for Economic and Military needs. Here the Japanese economy contiues to go full out..... we need to come up with a real good reason for this. Since military spending in Japan was already approaching 50% or more of Japans yearly budget they would be very hard pressed to pay CASH for Oil and Premium prices to buy or lease Neutral tankers. <BR/><BR/>Basically the Japanese were buying fully refined finished products basically bunker oil, Gasoline, Diesel, Kerosine and what they termed Aviation spirits directly from the US and delivered on US Flagged Tankers. Japan also despite having Manchurian Iron ore were purchasing every bit of US scrap iron they could afford.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2935524795017491645.post-35213516286230224802008-02-12T20:44:00.000-08:002008-02-12T20:44:00.000-08:00olefin here read your post CJ - again one thing th...olefin here <BR/><BR/>read your post CJ - again one thing that has to be taken into account is Bobby's story where after multiple carriers are dispatched to other fronts in the Pacific he specifically says only five carriers are left in one particular area of the Pacific - now that alone suggests a much larger Japanese fleet than in OTL - where during most of the war they would have been hard pressed to have five carriers active in their whole fleet let alone in just one area after several had been dispatched elsewhere<BR/><BR/>if you look at the sheer numbers you can see that they had to have a lot more than they did in OTL - maybe not all with top of the line pilots but still active duty carriersAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2935524795017491645.post-58828032483287842412008-02-12T20:06:00.000-08:002008-02-12T20:06:00.000-08:00Still working on the carrier stuff - got sidetrack...Still working on the carrier stuff - got sidetracked with cruiser replacement stuff. <BR/><BR/>Some random thoughts in the meantime:<BR/><BR/>Lead Lease Tankers to Germany<BR/>* I kinda doubt it. The big reason the British got tankers and cargo ships via Lend Lease was because of the large numbers of U-boats running around in the Atlantic sinking such ships. While there is a case to be made for a couple of Soviet surface raiders running around early in the Eurasian War, there isn't much of one significant numbers of Soviet submarines doing the same. <BR/><BR/>Japanese CV Losses<BR/>* Bear in mind that the surge in CV construction in OTL came after the Japanese lost five CVs in one month - all within the first six months of war. Here they didn't lose their first CV until eight months into the war (Santa Cruz) and they didn't lose their next one until month ten (Java Sea). Then next two losses were in month eleven when they lost two with another damaged (Midway). They lost their next two in September 1947 (The Slot).<BR/>* I've been playing around with some ideas on Java Sea. If the IJN really had that many CVs available, the AfD Eastern Fleet never would have made it out of the Java Sea alive. <BR/>* They may have gotten a few of the shadow carriers in ATL 1945, but worked up air groups are a different story. Parts of 'Shattered Sword' makes for some interesting reading in this regard. <BR/><BR/>IJN Tankers/Oilers<BR/>* Bear in mind that for the Hawaii/Midway operation, the IJN brought out a larger Kido Butai than in OTL. A significant chunk of it also hung around for a substantial amount of time to support the Midway invasion.<BR/>* There is a good chance that a good chunk of the Combined Fleet came out with the invasion force in case part of PACFLT tried to interfere with the Midway invasion and hung around for a while. <BR/>* The Kido Butai had to have stayed pretty active in the area between the Marshall Islands and Midway in order for the US not to take Midway back a long time before they did. <BR/><BR/>All of that requires a large number of oilersCJhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04227819071706739787noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2935524795017491645.post-46114890605252704572008-02-12T14:37:00.000-08:002008-02-12T14:37:00.000-08:00Olefin hereOne thing that could solve both issues ...Olefin here<BR/><BR/>One thing that could solve both issues - i.e. where did Japan get all the tankers and where did they get all the carriers could be solved with a postulated new class of ships - i.e. a purpose built tanker that was made to be quickly converted to carriers in time of war or prior to the war<BR/><BR/>figure around 17,000 to 25,000 tons, able to carry 45 to 60 aircraft as a carrier, with some AA guns as a tanker and the ability to add more in its carrier configuration<BR/><BR/>say a class of ten ships all built between 1940-1945,with conversions starting in late 45 so they were ready by the start of the war to very early in 1947 <BR/><BR/>such a ship gives us a whole bunch of tankers and then a whole bunch of carriers - and kills two birds with one stoneAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2935524795017491645.post-90530815774500210212008-02-12T06:21:00.000-08:002008-02-12T06:21:00.000-08:00Olefin hereI have a feeling CT that the SAFB reall...Olefin here<BR/><BR/>I have a feeling CT that the SAFB really didnt care about the goodwill of the United States - they were fascist states and the US didnt want a war with Germany so they would have shipped oil to Japan - on Japanese and neutral tankers - and the combined oil production of Argentina, Bolivia and Peru is more than enough oil to keep Japan afloat when combined with Sakhalin’s production.<BR/> <BR/>That’s the one thing you keep forgetting is that the SAFB has large amounts of oil to sell, needs iron ore and coal (which Japan had), and military equipment (which Japan had – face it even 1941 Japanese designs are better than 1920’s and 30’s stuff the SAFB had and the SAFB couldn’t build destroyers and cruisers which Japan did have as items to be sold to the SAFB in exchange for oil). <BR/><BR/>As for tankers - who knows how many tankers the US may have built for Germany and Italy during the period they were supporting the Axis - if the US built merchant hulls for Britain during Lend Lease in OTL then they may have built them for Germany and Italy as well. <BR/><BR/>And Germany had a lot more than just Ploesti – they had their own synthetic production which was considerable by 1942-43 and they had the oilfields of Hungary, Austria and Poland as well. <BR/><BR/>And if you cutoff shipping oil thru Suez that doesn’t affect oil shipments from Iraq – they would just ship it from ports in the Persian Gulf.<BR/><BR/>Japan also had the full oil production of Sakhalin which means they started with a lot more oil than they had in OTL prior to the US oil shipment cutoff. <BR/><BR/>That combined with the SAFB, Axis and Iraq oil shipments gave them more than enough oil to build their fleet, build tankers (including some that were most likely auxiliary carriers that were built to be able to be converted to be used as such when war started) and stay very comfortable up until the start of WWII. After that all they had was SAFB oil and Sakhalin – which was enough to keep them alive but probably not enough to let them grow or keep up the tempo of fleet and army operations they needed.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2935524795017491645.post-57476363281436866682008-02-11T21:00:00.000-08:002008-02-11T21:00:00.000-08:00*Chuckles*Ok, Oelfin I wished the board was up so ...*Chuckles*<BR/><BR/>Ok, Oelfin I wished the board was up so we could discuss this in a better fashion.<BR/><BR/>Basically in the 1930 and 1940's their are to my knowledge only 3 Nations with a decent number of Excess tankers. The British, Dutch and the United States. Italian and German tankers are busy picking up oil and delivering it to Germany and Italy.<BR/><BR/>As for South America I think that if the US institutes and Oil Embargo in say 1941 or 1942 the pressure the US can put on the Neutral South American countries is just huge. <BR/><BR/>Durring the 1st Russian/German War only Polesti is available to the German along with Iraqi Oil. So for atleast one Year 1942 the Japanese donot have oil from the United States and very limited Oil from Iraq delivered on whatever neutral tankers the Japanese and Germans can manage to find. This period requires Dutch East Indies Oil or the Japanese economy will use up its total reserves durring this one year.<BR/><BR/>From the End of the 1st German/Russian war in 1942 till atleast late 1943 Grozny and Baku are busy being rebuilt and what little production they have is being utilized bye the Germans in there huge expansion of their mobile forces and Airforce.<BR/><BR/>By Mid to Late 1943 production at Baku and Grozny should be getting back to normal and shipments of Oil to Japan can go from the Black sea to the Mediteranian, thru the Suez Canal and off to Japan.<BR/><BR/>But in late 1944 with the Persian crisis in full swing the British might close the Suez Canal to all Italian, British, and Turkish ships and possibly Japanese flagged vessels as well. <BR/><BR/>Anyway I see huge problems getting comming up with ways to get Japan more oil then they were getting historically from the United States in the Period from 1941 till 1945 the Excess Oil is going to be very hard to find as Grozny and Baku will have been badly damaged in the fighting over them. In addition in the Germans start trans-shipping oil to Japan in this period when the US has an Oil Embargo against Japan they risk the good will of the United States and that includes all the materials they need to rebuild after the 1st Euro-Asian war.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2935524795017491645.post-68789746490146949142008-02-11T06:09:00.000-08:002008-02-11T06:09:00.000-08:00Olefin hereThere is one big source of oil that Jap...Olefin here<BR/><BR/>There is one big source of oil that Japan had that they didnt have in OTL - and that is Argentina, Bolivia and Peru - which would have sold them oil in exchange for military equipment, resources (Japan did have iron ore and coal that the SAFB needed from their home islands plus deposits in China, Manchuria and the areas they occupied in Russia), and plain old money<BR/><BR/>That oil, combined with oil shipped from Iraq and Germany (i.e. Baku, Grozny, Ploesti, etc..) is what Japan lived on and was able to build their military machine on.<BR/><BR/>By the way one place their tankers may have come from could have been German, Italian,etc.. tankers caught in Japan at the wars start. There would have been a lot of tanker traffic to Japan and thus they may have gotten a good sized infusion of tanker tonnage just from Axis ships that couldnt get home.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2935524795017491645.post-49120583867531166872008-02-10T21:56:00.000-08:002008-02-10T21:56:00.000-08:00I agree CJ that the Japanese are going to need mor...I agree CJ that the Japanese are going to need more tankers lots more tankers if they want to even keep some of those ships at sea for any period of time.<BR/><BR/>I do wonder where all the extra oil to run all the extra ships and fill all the extra tankers and train all those extra pilots came from starting in 1941 and going through to the start of the US / Japanese war. I mean all the Oil in Iraq simply isnt enough to supply Japan with what it needs and who's tankers are going to deliver that oil to Japan.<BR/><BR/>I think we have to have Japan do something that doesnt scare the Dutch into agreeing with the United States on the Oil Embargo. Which isnt so hard with France and Holland not being occupied.<BR/><BR/>Even so once the European War kicks off Japan is cut off from its supplies of oil rather quickly which can explain its rapid entry into the war.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2935524795017491645.post-83442345413209025092008-02-08T16:10:00.001-08:002008-02-08T16:10:00.001-08:00Olefin hereI dont agree with you on the tankers CJ...Olefin here<BR/><BR/>I dont agree with you on the tankers CJ - and the main reason is the sheer number of carriers in the story. While I did use historical names I am not implying that Shinano was Yamato class - just used the name for an improved Taiho CV since it was a historical Japanese CV name.<BR/><BR/>If you look at comments Bobby makes in the timeline - things like only 5 CV's being available in the Central Pacific since others have been dispatched to three other areas, the losses early on that didnt seem to concern the Japanese that much (i.e. the carriers lost in the Solomons and near Singapore), etc.. you see that Japan must have truly had a very massive carrier fleet compared to OTL.<BR/><BR/>And CT I think that you are right - they most likely did get enough pilots trained for the initial manning - but once they lost pilots as they had to with the kind of intense operations seen here the quality of their carrier aviators must have pretty rapidly declined.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com